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Note
The Driver's Privacy Protection Act:
On the Fast Track to National Harmony
or Commercial Chaos?
Oliver J. Kim*
On June 2, 1987, seventeen year-old Robert John Bardo
visited the Burbank Studios, hoping to present his favorite ac-
tress, Rebecca Schaeffer, with a bouquet of flowers and a teddy
bear.' As part of the studio's standard operating procedure, the
studio security guards refused to let Bardo onto the set and
sent Schaeffer a note that "an overly persistent fan" had at-
tempted to contact her.2 On July 18, 1989, Bardo succeeded in
meeting the unsuspecting actress outside her apartment.
However, instead of showing his admiration by bringing
Schaeffer tokens of affection, he ambushed Schaeffer and shot
her to death.3
Bardo had little difficulty locating Schaeffer's residence.
At the time of the incident, California law permitted the Cali-
fornia Department of Motor Vehicles to release a resident's
complete driving record, including his or her home address, for
a mere five dollars.4 During his trial, Bardo testified that after
being unable to meet Schaeffer at her television studio, he
hired a private detective who found her address through the
California Department of Motor Vehicles.5
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1995,
Indiana University, Bloomington. The author would like to thank Amy Hart-
ing and Alvin Hayes of the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles. The author
would also like to thank Adam Gislason, Tae-Yoon Kim, Dana Shenker, and
Lois Magner Kim for their helpful advice and suggestions.
1. See Tracy Wilkinson, Murder Suspect's "Obsession" Foretold in Studio




5. See id. The California Department of Motor Vehicles annually proc-
essed nearly 16 million requests for driver and motor vehicle records at a cost
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Shocked by the relative ease with which Bardo obtained
Schaeffer's home address, legislators in star-studded California
used Schaeffer's death as a rallying cry to introduce reforms to
control access to state databases. 6  Congress, too, decided to
take corrective measures by implementing the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA), which requires all states to adopt pro-
cedures restricting access to motor vehicle records.' Although
the act regulated the commercial distribution of such records,
its sponsor, Senator Barbara Boxer, added that she believed
people also have a right to keep information collected by the
government private.8
State governments reacted differently to the enactment of
DPPA. Whereas some states welcomed DPPA as a means of
reducing administrative workload,9 others feared that DPPA
compliance would mean steep financial burdens.'0 Addition-
ally, for some states, DPPA threatened a practice that provided
a steady stream of revenue: selling driver and motor vehicle re-
cords to mass-marketers." Rather than face such costs, several
states have challenged this regulatory scheme as a violation of
the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments.'
2
of $1 to $5 per transaction. See id.
6. At the state level, California Assemblyman Mike Roos introduced a
bill that would allow individuals to list post office boxes or business addresses
on their driver records. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 1808.21 (West 1999); see also
Wilkinson, supra note 1, § 2, at 1 (discussing the Rebecca Schaeffer shooting
and identifying Roos as the assemblyman who introduced the bill).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994 & Supp. II 1997). Senator Barbara Boxer
introduced DPPA, which ultimately was passed into law as part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993. See 139 CONG. REC.
S15745-01, *S15761 (1993); see also infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text
(discussing the passage and implementation of DPPA).
8. See Marc Sandalow, Boxer Bill Would Protect Privacy of DMVRecords,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1993, at A6 ("This bill recognizes that people have the
right to more privacy and a right to more control over the disclosure of infor-
mation that the government collects about them.").
9. See John Yacavone, Is Your State Prepared to Implement the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act?, MOVE, Spring 1997, at 20, 22.
10. See Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (W.D. Okla.
1997), rev'd, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977,
981 (D.S.C. 1997) (finding that "implementation of the DPPA would impose
substantial costs"), affd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct.
1753 (1999).
11. See Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (noting
that Wisconsin generates $8 million annually from sales of motor vehicle rec-
ords), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Yacavone, supra note 9, at
23 (noting that several states sell motor vehicle records).
12. See Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding
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Underlying the administrative and economic rationales is
the concern over how government bureaucracies control and
use individuals' personal information. 3 Fears of "Big Brother"
using the extensive information found in government data-
banks have long gripped the popular consciousness.' 4 It is easy
to dismiss popular accounts of such fears as mere fiction, but it
is nonetheless true that both public and private actors main-
tain vast databases that contain personal information such as
social security numbers, consumer transactions, or medical his-
tory.1
5
Individuals, however, must give up some privacy to enjoy
the conveniences of modern society.' 6 For example, a bank may
want to know if an applicant has ever been convicted of credit
fraud, or a doctor may need to know what medications a patient
is currently taking. 7 Clearly such knowledge has value both to
the individual and to society. 8 At some point, however, an in-
dividual's privacy outweighs the value of releasing personal,
private information to the public. Information technology may
expose key, private elements of individual autonomy, including
DPPA constitutional), rev'd, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999); Travis, 12 F.
Supp. 2d at 921 (holding DPPA unconstitutional); Oklahoma, 994 F. Supp. at
1358 (same); Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 977 (holding DPPA unconstitutional);
see also Loving v. United States, No. 97-6060, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 23639, at
*4 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 1997) (dismissing a First Amendment claim for lack of
standing).
13. See Robert Franklin, Keeping Open Records Open, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., Feb. 2, 1994, at A12 (arguing that by not giving the public access to mo-
tor vehicle records, DPPA will allow "convicted murderers and drug users [to
operate] school buses" and "drunk drivers to fly commercial airplanes"); Yaca-
vone, supra note 9, at 22 (noting that approximately half of the states had
"open records" laws at the time DPPA was passed).
14. See, e.g., GEORGE ORwELL, 1984 (1949); ENEMY OF THE STATE (Touch-
stone Pictures 1998); THE NET (Columbia Pictures 1995).
15. See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999).
Through motor vehicle agencies, states own one of the nation's most extensive
databases. See STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY 59 (1993) (noting
that in 1989, more than 165 million Americans held a driver's license-and
thus were registered with a state motor vehicle agency).
16. See ETZIONI, supra note 15, at 5-7. As an unparalleled form of identi-
fication, the driver's license is a symbol of modem convenience: it allows its
holder not only to drive but also to purchase alcohol, to register to vote, to
write checks, and to do countless other activities requiring identification. See
NOCK, supra note 15, at 59.
17. See generally ETZIONI, supra note 15 (discussing modem society's
need to balance public good against individual privacy).
18. See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2384 (1996).
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with whom we associate, 9 where we go,20 and what we con-
sume.21 The challenge then for modern society is to determine
where that balance should be struck, and who should make and
enforce such a decision. When the Supreme Court considers
the constitutionality of DPPA,22 the Court will have the oppor-
tunity-if it chooses-to limit or expand how the federal gov-
ernment implements civil rights legislation.
Using DPPA as a model, this Note explores when Congress
may regulate state practices in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions on federalism. Part I describes the state of Commerce
Clause and privacy jurisprudence leading up to the passage of
DPPA. Part II analyzes the possible means available to Con-
gress to pass DPPA. Part II also suggests that privacy has real
value as a commodity and should be protected as a commercial
right, not a civil one. This Note concludes that DPPA is a con-
stitutionally permissible exercise of federal commercial regula-
tory power.
I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS ABILITY TO
REGULATE STATE ACTIVITIES
A. CONGRESSIONAL POWER To REGULATE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
One of Congress's greatest legislative powers is the ability
to regulate interstate commerce. 23 After struggling with the
19. See, e.g., John P. Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy, and the First
Amendment, 102 YALE L.J. 747 (1992).
20. See, e.g., Peter Wayner, Closed Door Policy: Princeton's Electronic Se-
curity System, Designed to Protect Students, Makes Some Feel Safer and Oth-
ers Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1998, at Dl.
21. See, e.g., Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got Your Number: An Overview of
Legislation and Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as
Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529 (1998); Tim
Huber, Hatch Says U.S. Bancorp Sold Private Data, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
June 10, 1999, at IA.
22. See Condon v. Reno, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999) (granting certiorari).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Al-
exander Hamilton) (discussing the need for uniform commercial policy). Since
the New Deal era, the Supreme Court has seemingly "rubber stamped" any
federal commercial policies with a connection to interstate commerce, however
remote. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968) (holding that
"where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce,
the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is
of no consequence"); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
261 (1964) (finding an interstate commercial link sufficient to uphold applica-
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question of what activities constitute commerce, 24 the Supreme
Court held that any federal commercial regulation reasonably
related to the national economy could be considered a constitu-
tional exercise of the Commerce Clause. 25 Under this broad in-
terpretation of commerce, the federal government has used
commercial regulations to provide for a wide variety of civil
rights. Often, these regulations intrude on what some might
consider traditionally local, intrastate activities.26 Just as the
United States uses commercial regulations against sovereign
nations that have committed human rights abuses, the federal
government has used its commercial powers against the
economies of sovereign states that have failed to protect the
civil rights of minorities.27
tion of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act against a motel because it served
out-of-state customers and bought out-of-state goods).
Federal regulatory power over interstate commerce is so strong that
states may not impinge on interstate commerce even when Congress has not
explicitly or directly regulated a commercial activity; such state regulatory
conduct might cause economic warfare between the states and cripple the na-
tional economy. See Benjamin C. Bair, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
State-Mandated Preference Laws in Public Contracting: Developing a More
Substantive Application of the Market-Participant Exception, 93 MICH. L. REV.
2408 (1995). States may act as "market participants," or in a similar fashion
to any private business, however, without threatening interstate commerce.
See generally Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant
Doctrine, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559 (1990); James Hinshaw, Note, The Dormant
Commerce Clause After Garcia: An Application to the Interstate Commerce of
Sanitary Landfill Space, 67 IND. L.J. 511 (1992).
24. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189-
206 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the evolution of the Commerce Clause).
25. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act); see also Ann
Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
793, 795-96 (1996); David 0. Stewart, Back to the Commerce Clause: The Su-
preme Court Has Yet to Reveal the True Significance of Lopez, A.B.A. J., July
1995, at 46, 47.
26. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 243-44; Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 297 (1964).
27. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 301-05 (holding that Congress may intrude
on local activities when it, as a collective embodiment of the nation, feels such
local activities have an affect on interstate commerce).
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1. Congressional Power To Regulate Interstate Commerce Is
Not Absolute
In United States v. Lopez,28 the Supreme Court cast a
shadow of doubt over previously established Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. In Lopez, the majority emphasized that before
Congress could regulate an area of commercial activity, there
must be a substantial link between interstate commerce and
that activity. 29 The Court identified "three broad categories of
activity" from its jurisprudence where it had found a substan-
tial link to exist: "the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce," "the instrumentalities of commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce," or any activity that has a "sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce." 30 While the majority
opinion seemed to be only "restating" already existing catego-
28. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In his analysis of the federal Gun-Free School
Zones Act, Chief Justice Rehnquist seemingly developed a more stringent
standard for determining the constitutionality of federal legislation. See Su-
san M. Bauerle, Comment, Congress's Commerce Clause Authority: Is the Pen-
dulum Finally Swinging Back?, 1997 DET. C.L. REV. 49 (1997). But see Alt-
house, supra note 25, at 806-12 (considering whether Lopez is a "throwback,"
or a return to prohibiting federal regulation of areas traditionally regulated by
states). While Althouse argues that "Lopez is not a revival of National
League's affirmative limitation on the commerce power," she later notes that
"Lopez has the effect of preserving areas of state activity that are free from
federal interference." Id. at 811. While Lopez may preserve federalism, this is
only a side effect, not its main purpose. Thus, one could read Lopez as ignor-
ing federalism issues and acting solely as an outer limit to the Commerce
Clause.
29. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 637 ("We conclude, consistent with the great
weight of our case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether
the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce."). But see id.
at 599-600 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority's "substantial ef-
fects" test as an ineffective means of reigning in federal commerce regula-
tions); Althouse, supra note 25, at 800; Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting
United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31 CoLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 79-80 (1997). However, using prior case law to illus-
trate a "new" meaning of "substantial" is problematic: if cases such as Wickard
are examples of activities with substantial effects, then Lopez has not changed
the level of judicial review for the Commerce Clause. Without a clear defini-
tion, problems may arise in defining what is commerce, particularly in today's
information age. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Infor-
mation as a Commodity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (1992) (discussing information as commercial property).
30. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-60. The Lopez Court did not overrule any
prior case law regarding the Commerce Clause; instead, the majority opinion
attempted to fit famous-albeit far-reaching-Commerce Clause cases within
the newly identified three categories. See id. at 559-60.
228 [Vol 84:223
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ries of commerce, it failed to flesh out the meaning of each
category.3
1
Lower courts have applied the Lopez standard inconsis-
tently when reviewing federal legislation with questionable
commercial aspects.32 Many courts have continued to uphold
federal regulatory statutes so long as a rational relationship
exists between the activity in question and interstate com-
merce.3 3 Courts also have accepted boilerplate rationales cre-
31. See Stewart, supra note 25, at 46-47.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 673 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding that a "substantial" nexus meant "at least some minimum effect on
interstate commerce.... [For example,] the purchasing of supplies from time
to time [such as] gasoline, anything of the sort [that] satisfies the element of
interstate commerce"); United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 662-64 (7th Cir.
1995) (upholding an instruction to the jury that "interstate commerce is af-
fected if [the jury found] that the Circuit Court of Cook County has any im-
pact, regardless of how small or indirect, on the movement of any money,
goods, services, or persons from one state to another"); United States v. Sher-
lin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1212-14 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that a university building is
used in interstate commerce and therefore Congress may criminalize its de-
struction by arson under the Commerce Clause).
One might doubt whether merely purchasing gasoline creates a "substan-
tial" effect on interstate commerce. See Stewart, supra note 25, at 48 ("[If
federal jurisdiction can be based on the mere transportation or shipment of a
product in interstate commerce, as the [federal] carjacking statute does, then
virtually all thefts-right down to shoplifting--can be federal offenses."). But
this interpretation of an interstate nexus is plausible when one considers that
the Lopez opinion explicitly includes "[e]ven Wickard, which is perhaps the
most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority [by penalizing lo-
cally grown and consumed goods because such goods could compete in the ag-
gregate with goods in interstate commerce]." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
One reason that lower courts may be hesitant to adopt a higher standard
of review is that the Supreme Court itself has not applied Lopez to subsequent
decisions. See United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 670-72 (1995) (per
curiam) (finding-without referring to Lopez-that defendant's purchase of
interstate goods and hiring of out-of-state workers for his mining operation
satisfied the interstate commerce requirement). Further, the Supreme Court
has validated "at least twelve cases ... under the Commerce Clause" in the
past two decades, suggesting that the Court has had ample opportunity to
consider new limits for Commerce Clause legislation. Robert F. Nagel, The
Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 656 (1996). Lopez could
therefore be read as more of a warning to Congress than a landmark case. See
id. at 655-56 (arguing that "the Court's record as a whole casts significant
doubt on whether decentralization is highly valued by most members of the
Court"); see also JOHN A. FEREJOHN & BARRY R. WEINGAST, THE NEW
FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? x-xi (1997). For examples of
various federal statutes threatened by Lopez, see St. Laurent, supra note 29,
at 61.
33. Such holdings might seem to conflict with Justice Rehnquist's view
that substantial must mean substantial. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. There is
sufficient language in the Lopez opinion, however, to justify these decisions.
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ated during litigation instead of congressional findings made
during the legislative process.34
2. The Tenth Amendment as an External Limit on the Reach
of the Commerce Clause
While the Framers envisioned a strong central govern-
ment,35 they did not intend to destroy the integrity of the
states.36 For example, the Constitution protects the states by
offering them equal representation in the Senate37 and forbid-
ding the federal government from altering a state's bounda-
ries.38 Further, the Tenth Amendment limits the scope of fed-
eral power by providing that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
[federal government] are reserved to the States."3 9 Thus even if
Congress enacts a federal regulation within the parameters of
an enumerated power, states may invoke the Tenth Amend-
ment to limit the scope of such a regulation.4' Although the
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (suggest-
ing that federal commercial regulations need a "connection or identification
with commercial concerns that are central to the Commerce Clause" and
warning that the majority opinion may overstep precedent).
34. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings,
Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 695, 710-11 (1996). While the Lopez Court suggested that congressional
findings might influence a decision by showing the link between commerce
and the activity in question, the Court noted that such findings were in no
means dispositive. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
35. See THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay) (arguing that a strong union
will be more secure and just than a confederation made of state governments);
see also THE FEDERALIST at xii (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1987) (insisting that "the
central government must enjoy unquestioned supremacy in its assigned
fields"); IRWIN UNGER, THESE UNITED STATES 159-60 (4th ed. 1989).
36. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison); see also UNGER, supra
note 35, at 160.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII, § 1.
38. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
40. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2197 (1998) (discussing inter-
pretative doctrines that limit the breadth of federal regulations into state
functions); Rex E. Lee, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Legacy of
Garcia, 1996 BYU L. REV. 329 (1996). As of yet, the Court has not placed such
restrictive limits on other enumerated powers. See, e.g., New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-69 (1992) (upholding monetary incentives as a per-
missible means of encouraging states to adopt federal programs because such
grants still maintain political accountability); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987) (upholding Congress's use of the Taxing and Spending Clause to
require states to impose a minimum drinking age to receive federal highway
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Supreme Court has held that the Tenth Amendment simply
recognizes the federalist system of government, the Amend-
ment is an external limit on the reach of federal powers.41
a. The Tenth Amendment as a Reminder of the Dual Nature of
Federalism
The Constitution does not explicitly mention federalism,
but the Supreme Court has found implicit safeguards for the
federalist system in the Constitution.42 In Garcia v. San Anto-
nio,43 the Court held that the Tenth Amendment is a mere
"truism," or a reminder that the federalist system divides pow-
ers between the federal government and the states.' By ex-
plicitly granting a power to the federal government, the Consti-
tution prohibits the states from exercising that same power.
45
The Constitution, however, "offers no guidance about where the
frontier between state and federal power lies."46
The Garcia Court suggested that the best way to protect
federalism and states' interests is through the political process,
not the judicial system.47 After all, Congress embodies the in-
fimding). But see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (using doc-
trines of statutory interpretation to limit the expansion of remedial legislation
passed under Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers into state-
determined age limits for state judges) "In the face of... ambiguity, we will
not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions
regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to its Commerce Clause pow-
ers or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
41. See infra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
42. See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); FERC v. Missis-
sippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
43. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
44. See id. at 531 (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 39 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the
peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insur-
rection."). But see Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]oday's
decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric
when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.").
45. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548 ("[T]he sovereignty of the States is limited
by the Constitution itself. A variety of sovereign powers, for example, are
withdrawn from the States by Article I, § 10."); see also New York, 505 U.S. at
156 (noting that whatever powers are not granted to the federal government
still belong to the states).
46. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.
47. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-53 (noting that the "effectiveness of the
federal political process in preserving the States' interest is apparent even to-
day in the course of federal legislation").
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terests of both the people (through the House of Representa-
tives)4" and the states (through the Senate)49 in a way that the
unelected federal judiciary cannot.5 ° Through this system, the
states have enjoyed considerable benefits, including land
grants and financial aid."
b. The Tenth Amendment Ensures Political Accountability at
Both the State and Federal Levels
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Tenth Amendment to provide additional safeguards for feder-
alism and thus limit the expansion of federal power.5 2 First,
the Supreme Court in New York v. United States5 3 held that
Congress cannot "commandeer the States' legislative processes
by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program."54 If the federal government commandeers
the states' legislative processes to enact a federal policy deci-
sion, then the electorate cannot hold the appropriate body po-
litically accountable for enacting such a policy.5 But if Con-
gress simply offers grants or other financial rewards to
encourage states to adopt a federal policy, then residents could
48. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall
be... chosen... by the People.").
49. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States
shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof .... ."), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
50. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550 ("[Tihe principal means chosen by the
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself."); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
481-84 (2d ed. 1995); UNGER, supra note 35, at 159 (discussing the develop-
ment of the American system of separation of powers).
51. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 553.
52. See Peter A. Lauricella, Comment, The Real "Contract with America":
The Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60
ALB. L. REV. 1377, 1378-79 (1997). The Supreme Court has also used the
Eleventh Amendment to limit federal expansion. See College Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2230-31
(1999) (determining that states do not waive their Eleventh Amendment im-
munity when acting as market participants). However, the question of
whether DPPA violates the Eleventh Amendment is not before the courts and
is beyond the scope of this Note.
53. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
54. Id. at 145 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)); see also Jeffrey B. Teichert, Note, New York v.
United States: Constitutional Order or Commerce Clause Chaos?, 7 BYU J.
PUB. L. 377 (1993).
55. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
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still hold their state representatives politically accountable for
adopting such policies. For example, residents can vote against
state legislators who decide to accept a federal grant in ex-
change for adopting a federal regulatory scheme.
56
Second, in Printz v. United States,57 the Supreme Court
struck down a federal statute that forced state law enforcement
officials to implement federal policies because the statute vio-
lated federalism." The Court reasoned that state officials
could not be truly accountable to their local electorate if they
also had to follow regulatory mandates set by the federal gov-
ernment.5 9 Accordingly, state executives should not be respon-
sible for implementing and executing federal policy.6' The ma-
jority concluded that "[wihen a 'Law... for carrying into
Execution' the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state
sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions
we mentioned earlier, it is not a 'La[w] ... proper for carrying
into Execution the Commerce Clause."'61
56. See id.
57. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
58. See id. at 935 (striking down the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, which required local law enforcement officers to perform background
checks on individuals wishing to purchase a gun). But see South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988) (noting that any federal policy will require
some change in state regulatory policy); Jackson, supra note 40, at 2246-55
(arguing against the use of a "bright line" rule to prohibit legislative comman-
deering).
59. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 920; cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madi-
son).
60. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 926-27.
61. Id. at 923-24 (cross-reference omitted) (quoting language from U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8). Justice Thomas, however, suggested that the Commerce
Clause could be limited externally by the explicit provisions of an amendment
rather than vague notions of federalism. See id. at 938 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that "the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at least
as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul
of [the Second] Amendments protections," and therefore that to construe the
Commerce Clause expansively would make other portions of the Constitution
superfluous). But see Jackson, supra note 40, at 2196 (arguing that Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, "was thus profoundly mistaken when he ar-
gued that federal imposition of enforcement duties on state law enforcers is...
unsupportable"). Jackson argues that the rigidity of the Printz holding could
have substantial effects on uniform national policies such as those in the areas
of labor and employment. See id. at 2212-13, 2253 (asserting that "[i]nstead of
a bright-line rule against 'legislative commandeering,' courts could adopt a
presumption that federal directives to state legislatures are not 'Necessary
and Proper" (citation omitted)). Of course, such a flexible rule could lead to
judicial law-making, allowing federal judges to pick and choose which federal
regulations are necessary and proper for a state legislature to adopt.
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B. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AS A MEANS OF ENFORCING
CIVIL RIGHTS AGAINST THE STATES
The federal government also may regulate the states under
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Un-
like the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment explic-
itly allows the federal government to override state sovereignty
when protecting individuals from abuses by the state.63 Con-
gress, however, may only use its regulatory powers to remedy
state abuses, not create rights.
64
1. Congress Can Only Enforce Civil Rights Explicitly Guaran-
teed by the Constitution or Determined by the Judiciary
Congress has passed expansive legislation under the Four-
teenth Amendment to combat widespread discrimination in ar-
eas such as voting65 and employment.66 Congress may enforce
most of the first eight constitutional amendments against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.67 Controversies
arise, however, when the courts recognize a right that is not
explicitly enumerated in the Constitution.68 But even if a right
is not enumerated within the Constitution, the Court has found
implicit protections "that are 'so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'
69
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
462 (1991) (noting that "the Equal Protection Clause provides a check on...
state authority").
63. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 462.
64. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) ("Congress does
not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been
given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation.").
65. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); see also
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
66. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-33
(1994).
67. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("This Court, in a series of decisions, has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment absorbs and applies to the States those specifics of the first eight
amendments which express fundamental personal rights.").
68. See generally id. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting); see also FRED H.
CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 60 (1997) (discussing the contro-
versy of the privacy cases); RICHARD HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY
79-80 (1987) (discussing contraception cases); STONE ET AL., supra note 24, at
940-1059.
69. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933)).
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Nonetheless, the judiciary has not tolerated exercises of en-
forcement legislation as readily as it has federal commercial
legislation.7 ° The scope of legislation passed under the Four-
teenth Amendment may only remedy discriminatory practices
defined by the Court, not Congress.7 In other words, Congress
can only create remedial legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect rights explicitly found in the Constitu-
tion or rights determined by the judiciary to be within the Due
Process Clause.72
2. Judicial Findings on Privacy
The Supreme Court has never recognized a general consti-
tutional right to privacy.7 3  Rather, the Court has drawn on
common law tort theory74 to find that an individual's expecta-
70. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
71. See id. at 520 (holding that congressional authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is remedial, not determinative). In Boerne, the Court
struck down the Religious Freedoms Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to
bb-4 (1994), noting that this nation had never experienced a history of relig-
ious discrimination strong enough to warrant remedial legislation affecting
state practices.
72. See id. at 531 (noting that little history exists in the legislative record
on "animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices or [an indication of]
some widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this country").
While preventative measures may sometimes be warranted, granting
Congress the authority to determine what is a violation would give the legisla-
ture power exceeding the scope and intention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 532 (stating that "[r]emedial legislation under § 5 'should be adapted
to the mischief and wrong which the [Fourteenth] [Almendment was intended
to provide against") (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883)).
But see In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that "Congress
has often provided statutory protection of individual liberties that exceed the
Supreme Court's interpretation of constitutional protection" (citation omit-
ted)), cert. denied sub noma. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 119
S. Ct. 43 (1998).
73. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 791
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing "grave doubts as to the existence of a constitu-
tional right of privacy"). But see Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533
(1989) (noting that "privacy rights are... 'plainly rooted in the traditions and
significant concerns of our society" (citation omitted)).
74. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis ad-
vocated persuasively for a right to privacy. See Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel
D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The theories
advanced in The Right to Privacy were used successfully in developing tort li-
ability for public disclosure of private facts and other privacy-based torts. See
DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT: SEX, DRUGS, AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE 75-88, 91 (1992) (discussing the
common law foundation of the right to privacy); see also Jonathan B. Mintz,
The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Do-
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tion of privacy may limit government intrusion into his or her
personal affairs. 5 For example, the Court has found such an
expectation to exist in areas such as police investigations7 6 and
reproductive rights, including contraception"7 and abortion."8
In Whalen v. Roe,79 the Court identified two areas "sometimes
characterized as protecting 'privacy' .... [olne is the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another
main, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 432, 432-33 nn.37-39 (1996) (noting that "[m]ost
states recognize an invasion of privacy action for the public disclosure of pri-
vate facts through their common law" and listing the cases establishing such a
tort in 41 states and the District of Columbia).
75. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) ("Would
we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for tell-
tale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.").
"Privacy" is an amorphous and difficult concept to define legally. See, e.g.,
C. Herman Pritchett, Foreword to DAvID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND
PUBLIC POLICY at vii, vii-ix (1979) (offering anecdotal problems including the
refusal of officials at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to release the name of a
visiting American citizen who died in a fall; the officials believed they were
restricted by the Privacy Act). Advances in technology often conflict with con-
temporary notions of privacy and call for adequate protection. See, e.g.,
MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 74, at 147 (describing "mind and body" tests,
such as genetic testing, that either will be or are being used in the workplace).
Such legal protections, however, must be specifically tailored to permit legiti-
mate uses of information. See Pritchett, supra, at ix (discussing an Oregon
privacy statute that prohibited state officials from releasing an individual's
criminal record; the legislature failed to realize that the statute would prevent
police from contacting recent arrestees' relatives for bail).
76. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (requiring law en-
forcement officers to obtain a search warrant before using wiretapping de-
vices).
77. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 485. In Griswold, the Supreme
Court held that Connecticut could not prohibit the use of contraceptives by
married couples. See id. The level of intrusion necessary to enforce such a law
would place an impermissible burden on a married couple's intimate relation-
ships. See id. at 485-86. Although the right to privacy is not explicitly found
in the Constitution, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade concluded that privacy
"is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty." 410
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). For an interesting note on the legal strategies (or
scheming) behind Griswold, see HIXSON, supra note 68, at 79-80. Privacy is
still considered to be embedded within the Fourteenth Amendment; at times,
the Court has attempted to find a right of privacy included within penumbras
around the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. See Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977) (relying on Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53).
78. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
79. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). The Court considered whether a state registry of
the names of patients using particular prescription drugs violated patients'
and doctors' rights to privacy. See id. at 591. Such a registry implicated both
an individual's right to nondisclosure as well as the right to make important
decisions in private. See id. at 600.
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is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions."8" "[Tihe accumulation of vast amounts of
80. Id. at 598-600 (citations omitted). Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Stevens pointed to several cases for examples of the right to nondisclo-
sure of private facts, including California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,
82 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing access to financial
records could invade an individual's rights to privacy and free association),
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (privacy and possession of pornogra-
phy in the home), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy and
contraceptives), and Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (privacy and searches and seizures). Justice Stevens also cited
a number of cases upholding the right to make personal decisions free from
government intrusion, including Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (privacy
and abortion), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy and abortion), Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (privacy and marriage), Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (privacy and education), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (same). See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600 nn.25-26. Despite
the Court's delineation of privacy into two distinct spheres, "privacy" remains
a difficult concept to define in clear legal terms. See HIXSON, supra note 68, at
46, 52-89 (discussing various legal and nonlegal scholars' thoughts on privacy).
In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court began limiting the
"kinds of important decisions" that fell within the second Whalen category. Id.
at 190-91. The Bowers Court considered whether a state statute criminalizing
homosexual sodomy unconstitutionally impinged on the right to privacy. See
id. at 190. Although enforcing the statute implicated the same problem as the
prohibition on contraception did in Griswold-how could a state enforce such a
statute without barging into a private citizen's bedroom?-the Court refused
to include sodomy within the right to privacy. See id. at 196. The majority
reasoned that it could not extend the right to privacy to include homosexual
activity without eventually including all consensual acts, such as drug use:
Victimless crimes, such as the possession and use of illegal drugs, do
not escape the law where they are committed at home. Stanley
[dealing with obscene materials in an individual's home] itself recog-
nized that its holding offered no protection for the possession in the
home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods. And if respondent's submis-
sion is limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between consenting
adults, it would be difficult, except by flat, to limit the claimed right
to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery,
incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are committed in
the home. We are unwilling to start down that road.
Id. at 195-96 (citation omitted).
In Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), the Supreme Court severely
limited a plaintiffs recourse for the public disclosure of private facts. See id.
at 541. The Court held that punishing a newspaper for disclosing the identity
of a rape victim violated the First Amendment. See id. at 532. While this
ruling led many commentators to pronounce "dead the more than century-old
tort of public disclosure of private facts," Mintz, supra note 74, at 426 & n.1,
Florida Star dealt with a newspaper that lawfully obtained private facts. The
newspaper was not a proper defendant for a civil lawsuit because such suits
might cause a chilling effect. See MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 74, at 84-
85 (noting that "[ilf fault lay anywhere, it was with the [police] department,
which itself violated the statute... [prohibiting releasing a rape] victim's
name"); see also Mintz, supra note 74, at 456 (discussing a theory of liability
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personal information in computerized data banks or other mas-
sive government files .... much of which is personal in charac-
ter and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed" impli-
cates both areas.81 Thus, the public had a right to be assured
that the state would maintain such information securely.82
Furthermore, the Court noted that "[t]he right to collect and
use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a
concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures."83 However, the Court found the state's interest-
combating illegal sales of prescription drugs-outweighed an in-
based on whether the private facts revealed were "lawfully obtained").
81. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605; see also VISIONS OF PRIVACY 6 (Colin J.
Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999); cf. HIXSON, supra note 68, at 209 (noting
that in 1971 "anyone who knows a credit grantor's identifying code number
and has access to a telephone may be able to reach the reservoir of detailed
financial information that already exists on over a hundred million persons,"
which today is a conservative estimate (citation omitted)).
In Whalen, the state wanted to register patients who used certain pre-
scription drugs. It hoped to use this registry to track down doctors and pa-
tients who resold prescription drugs on the black market. See Whalen, 429
U.S. at 591. The New York statute theoretically implicated both types of pri-
vacy, freedom from personal disclosures and independence in making impor-
tant decisions. See id. at 600. First, patients and doctors might decide to risk
potential medical or legal consequences rather than prescribe or obtain certain
drugs because of the chance that such information will become publicly
known. Their ability to make important decisions in private would thus be
affected. See id. Second, patients might fear that employers and family mem-
bers could find out that they used an often-abused substance, violating their
right to be free from disclosure of embarrassing personal information. See id.
82. See id. at 605. The right to privacy is really about control over one's
own person. See HIXSON, supra note 68, at 226-27 (suggesting that federal
statutes on privacy attempt to give citizens control over information collected
by the government). Individuals have little control over how personal informa-
tion is later used by data-collecting agencies. See Komuves, supra note 21, at
569-77. As one commentator noted,
[C] elebrities, alive or dead, retain rights to control others' use of their
names or likenesses for commercial purposes. For example, if Elvis
Presley's heirs can prevent someone from using his name on a bar or
restaurant to make money, why can't the ordinary citizen prevent the
commercial use of his name through the sale of [his] name and SSN
on a mailing list?
Id. at 574 (citation omitted).
83. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. The Court left open the question of the ex-
tent of this duty: "[w]e therefore need not, and do not, decide any question
which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated pri-
vate data-whether intentional or unintentional-or by a system that did not
contain comparable security provisions." Id. at 605-06. The Court, however,
noted that such a "duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution." Id. at 605.
For a discussion on problems inherent in modem record-keeping systems, see
Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic
Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847, 851-58
(1998), and Glenn Chatmas Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It Constitu-
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ombating illegal sales of prescription drugs-outweighed an in-
dividual's interest in making decisions and being free from em-
barrassment.8 4
Lower courts have struggled to maintain a balance be-
tween the public's need for various types of information and in-
dividual privacy." Clearly, some personal information is
needed for an orderly, efficient government.8 6 Federal and
state actors often have legitimate reasons for obtaining infor-
mation on an individual. For example, agents of public regula-
tory agencies may need access to personal records to promote
public health and safety 7 or ensure the honesty and respect-
ability of public employees. 8  At the same time, the govern-
ment must assure citizens that such information will not be ar-
bitrarily released in an embarrassing fashion or used to abridge
their freedom. Although courts have adopted a balancing test
to weigh these two competing interests, the balance has gener-
ally been struck in the government's favor. 89 Some courts have
tional to Give It Out?): Caller Identification Technology and the Right to In-formational Privacy, 37 UCLA L. REV. 145, 202-05 (1989). Although these ar-
ticles consider private companies' systems, the problems with many private
companies' record-keeping systems mirror the problems public agencies face
when creating their own registries.
84. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600, 603-04; supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
85. Compare American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786,
791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("We begin our analysis by expressing our grave doubts as
to the existence of a constitutional right of privacy in the nondisclosure of per-
sonal information."), with Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 886 F. Supp.
1186, 1189-92 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that the government's need for an indi-
vidual's personal information must be balanced against his or her privacy in-
terests), affd, 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995). The circuits are split on the stan-
dard of review privacy claims about disclosure should receive. See CATE,
supra note 68, at 64 (noting that the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
review Whalen-type scenarios under a seemingly higher standard, whereas
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits seem to limit Whalen severely).
86. See NOCK, supra note 15, at 8, 13.
87. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578-80
(3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Allis-Chambers Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1027, 1031
(E.D. Wis. 1980); see also Hayley Rosenman, Patients' Rights to Access Their
Medical Records: An Argument for Uniform Recognition of a Right of Access in
the United States and Australia, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1500, 1517-19 (1998).
88. See Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192-94 (4th Cir. 1990);
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110-11 (3d Cir.
1987).
89. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting
a balancing approach to a nondisclosure claim); Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578
(weighing factors that include the type of record requested, the information it
might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclo-
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only found for the government when satisfied that there are
sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that personal infor-
mation remains private.9" Government agencies may also be
held to a higher standard of accountability if they fail to keep
individuals' personal information private and inadvertently
release it. 91
sure, the injury to the relationship in which the record was generated, the
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the need for ac-
cess, and whether there is some recognizable public interest in granting ac-
cess).
In making its decision, a court also may consider the type of information
requested, the reason the information is needed, and the individual involved.
See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455-65 (1977). In
Nixon, the Supreme Court suggested that President Nixon might have had a
stronger privacy expectation in his personal effects had he not been the high-
est elected official. See id. "[Alny intrusion must be weighed against the pub-
lic interest in subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant's administra-
tion to archival screening.... Under this test, the privacy interest asserted by
appellant is weaker than that found wanting in the recent decision of Whalen
v. Roe." Id. at 458 (citations omitted). "[Tihe constitutionality of the [Presi-
dential Recordings and Materials Preservation] Act must be viewed in the con-
text... of appellant's status as a public figure." Id. at 465. President Nixon
had argued unsuccessfully that the archivists could not view his records be-
cause of potential public disclosure of "extremely private communications be-
tween him, and among others, his wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyers,
and clergyman, and his close friends, as well as personal diary dictabelts and
his wife's personal files." Id. at 459.
90. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3d Cir. 1986) (deter-
mining that the New Jersey horse racing commission's testing plan adequately
protected jockeys' privacy rights but "[i]f the Commission ceases to comply
with the proposed confidentiality rules, the jockeys may return to court with a
new lawsuit"); see also Komuves, supra note 21, at 572-74 (1998) (discussing a
growing judicial recognition of an individual's privacy in personal identifiers
such as social security numbers, but noting a lack of judicial remedies for im-
proper use of such identifiers).
One observer noted that the public sector is investing increasingly in
technology that will reduce costs and promote efficiency. See Budnitz, supra
note 83, at 872-74 (noting that the public sector's increasing reliance on "smart
cards" and other technological advances to distribute benefits to individuals
allows government employees greater access to personal, private information).
Such an investment may save money by reducing paper waste, "human capi-
tal," and storage costs, but states may not take security measures to ensure
the validity and security of collected information. Perhaps prophetically, Jus-
tice Brennan warned of the dangers in relying on massive computer data-
banks: "The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly
increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to
say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb
on such technology." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
91. See Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Information
is constitutionally protected when a legitimate expectation exists that it will
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C. PASSAGE OF THE DRIVER'S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
Although DPPA was initially designed to ease Hollywood's
fears of stalkers,9" the privacy statute received wide support
from various special interest groups concerned about the poten-
tial harms from state distribution of personal information.93
remain confidential while in the state's possession." (citation omitted)). Most
citizens, however, believe that information stored electronically will not re-
main confidential. See Budnitz, supra note 83, at 874. Such a conclusion is
not unreasonable, as anecdotal evidence about "hacking" and identity theft
demonstrates. See CATE, supra note 68, at 203 (noting that 90% of Americans
surveyed by a USA Today poll believe that data-collecting agencies should de-
velop and bear the expense of privacy-friendly "opt-in" systems, where con-
sumers request to become a data subject instead of requesting to be removed
from a data list ("opt out")); Budnitz, supra note 83, at 874-79 (discussing
problems in self-regulatory methods).
For example, in Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir.
1995), the Tenth Circuit considered whether an individual had a right to pri-
vacy in his wife's diary. After receiving the permission of the plaintiff, Gary
Sheets, to examine his deceased wife Kathy's diary, police investigators inad-
vertently placed the diary into a public investigative file. See id. at 1386. Salt
Lake City officials used Kathy Sheets' diary in their investigation of two
bombings. See id. While it was unclear whether the police assured her hus-
band that the diary's contents would remain confidential, Sheets testified that
he only gave the diary to the police because he expected it to remain private.
See id. at 1386, 1388. Passages from the diary, however, found their way into
three books on the incident, either as supporting materials or as direct quota-
tions. See id. at 1386. In affirming the jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Sheets
court held that the fact that the police could not recall whether they had "ini-
tially assured Mr. Sheets of the diary's confidentiality does not negate... that
an understanding of confidentiality did exist." Id. at 1388. Moreover, even
though the police might have a "compelling state interest" in receiving the di-
ary as part of their investigation, there was "no such compelling interest in the
dissemination of Mrs. Sheets' diary...." Id. at 1388-89; see also Fadjo v.
Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[E]ven if the information was
properly obtained [by the State Attorney], the state may have invaded Fadjo's
privacy in revealing it .... ").
92. See Sandalow, supra note 8, at A6; see also Scott Hays, Inside Celeb-
rity Obsessions, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1990, at El; Duke Helfand, No Rest For
Victims of Stalking, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1996, at B1.
Of course, movie stars are not the only people who wish to control access
to their addresses and other information. For example, Indianapolis mayor
and former Marion County prosecutor Stephen Goldsmith has "gone to elabo-
rate means" to keep his home address private because of numerous death
threats. Gerry Lanosga, Mayor's Secret Address Prompts Legal Inquiry,
INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, April 14, 1995, at B1.
93. See, e.g., Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1993:., Hearings on H.R.
3365 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Con-
gressman James P. Moran), available in 1994 WL 14168121 (discussing crimi-
nal applications of drivers and motor vehicle records); Hearings (testimony of
Professor Mary J. Culnan, Georgetown University, School of Business Admini-
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DPPA required all state agencies responsible for maintaining
drivers and motor vehicle records to prohibit the indiscriminate
release of such information to the general public by September
14, 1997. 94  Congress, however, recognized that there are le-
gitimate reasons for accessing such records and provided ex-
emptions for certain public and private actors such as courts, 95
law enforcement officers,96 insurance companies, 97 tow truck
operators,98 and commercial trucking employers. 99
stration), available in 1994 WL 14168083 (discussing the use of motor vehicle
information by "individual companies, direct marketers who compile data-
bases and then sell lists to other direct marketers, and firms that compile da-
tabases for use in prospect research by fundraisers" and the problems in in-
dustry self-regulation); Hearings (testimony of Janlori Goldman, American
Civil Liberties Union), available in 1994 WL 14168075 (discussing the ACLU
Privacy and Technology Project and arguing for a uniform national policy
"given that DMVs collect personal information as a condition of licensure, and
the information is intended for use in that context"); Hearings (testimony of
Donald L. Cahill, Legislative Chairman, Fraternal Order of Police), available
in 1994 WL 14168055 (testifying in support of DPPA); Hearings (testimony of
David Beatty, National Victims Center), available in 1994 WL 14168013 (dis-
cussing statistics from the National Victim Center and the inability of states
to respond adequately to the privacy concerns of domestic abuse victims);
Hearings (testimony of David F. Snyder, American Insurance Association),
available in 1994 WL 212701 (testifying in support of DPPA). But see, e.g.,
Hearings (testimony of Richard A. Barton, Direct Marketing Association),
available in 1994 WL 14168138 (testifying against DPPA in general but sup-
porting provisions that allow citizens to opt out of DPPA provisions); Hearings
(testimony of Richard Oppel, American Society of Newspaper Editors, the
Newspaper Association of America, the Reporters Committee for the Freedom
of the Press, the Radio-Television News Directors Association, the Society of
Professional Journalists, and the National Newspaper Association), available
in 1994 WL 212720 (offering anecdotal evidence of how journalists used driver
and motor vehicle records in various stories written to benefit the public).
In addition to DPPA, there are a host of other federal statutes and pro-
posals to regulate the dissemination of personal information. See generally
The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)-(q) (1994) (regulating federal rec-
ord-keeping and dissemination of personal information); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Co., 638 F.2d 570, 576-77 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing legis-
lation "relating to discrete subject areas provisions protecting an individual's
privacy in the information collected, and limiting the circumstances under
which there can be inspection and disclosure."); CATE, supra note 68, at 76-79
(discussing federal legislation aimed at public agencies); id. at 80-88 (discuss-
ing federal legislation aimed at particular private industries).
94. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 300003 (1994).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4) (1994).
96. See id. § 2721(b)(1).
97. See id. § 2721(b)(9) (Supp. II 1997).
98. See id. § 2721(b)(7) (1994).
99. See id. § 2721(b)(9) (Supp. II 1997).
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DPPA also prohibits states from disclosing records to mass-
marketers without providing citizens an opportunity to opt out
of such mass distributions."° The U.S. Attorney General could
impose fines on states that improperly disseminate driver or
vehicle records to an unauthorized individual. 10 1 In addition,
authorized recipients face civil penalties for releasing such in-
formation into the hands of an unauthorized third party.' 2
Several states easily complied with the DPPA require-
ments. For example, Alaska, Arkansas, and Hawaii already
had privacy legislation in place. 0 3 The majority of states had
less stringent or no privacy legislation, however, and a few
states even turned selling such personal records into a steady
source of revenue, often netting millions of dollars annually. 1°"
100. See id. § 2721(b)(12)(A)-(B) (1994); see also id. § 2721(b)(11) (allowing
a state to release personal information about an individual for any purpose as
long as the individual has had an opportunity to opt out and declined to do so).
An example of a distribution company is ACS, a California-based distribu-
tor of celebrity address lists that caters to "Entertainment Tonight," "Hard
Copy," and other national entertainment news programs. See Nancy Spiller,
Celebrity Address Lists Pose a Risk, TORONTO SUN, April 9, 1995, at 15. ACS,
which advertises both internationally and domestically, sells between 700 and
1,000 copies of its celebrity address list a month. See id.
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b) (1994) ("Any State department of motor vehi-
cles that has a policy or practice of substantial noncompliance... shall be
subject to a civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General of not more than
$5,000 a day for each day of substantial noncompliance.").
102. See id. § 2724(a)-(b). An individual whose personal information is dis-
seminated can bring a private cause of action against a "person who knowingly
obtains, discloses or uses personal information... for a purpose not permitted
[by DPPA]." Id. § 2724(a). In such a suit, a court may award actual damages
up to $2,500, punitive damages, reasonable attorney and other litigation fees,
and any other equitable relief within the court's discretion. See id. § 2724(b).
103. See Yacavone, supra note 9, at 22.
104. See David Beatty, Protect Motorists' Privacy, USA TODAY, April 14,
1994, at 1OA ("In most states (37, to be exact) anyone can walk into a motor
vehicle office with your tag number... and get your name, address and phone
number-no questions asked."); John Gibeaut, Keeping Federalism Alive:
Courts Overturn Law Barring State Release of Driver Record, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1998, at 38 (noting that "[more than 30 states allow access to [state motor ve-
hicle records], and many routinely sell driver's license lists to direct market-
ers"); Yacavone, supra note 9, at 22-23.
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II. PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY: CIVIL OR
COMMERCIAL
A. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT ON CHALLENGES TO DPPA
1. Approach of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
In Condon v. Reno, the Fourth Circuit was the first court to
strike down DPPA, affirming a district court's injunction. 0 5
The Condon court noted that "the question before this Court is
not whether the DPPA regulates commerce, but whether it is
consistent with the system of dual sovereignty established by
the Constitution."0 6 Thus, the crucial issue was not what ac-
tivity DPPA regulated but what actor DPPA regulated-here,
the states. 0 7
The Condon court believed that when a state challenges a
federal commercial regulation, "the resulting enactment is
analyzed by [a court] under one of two different lines of
cases."' Under the first line of cases, courts must uphold
"laws of general applicability that incidentally apply to state
governments."' 9 Congress, however, must state "with unmis-
takable clarity" that a law is generally applicable to states and
private actors alike."' Under the second line of cases, courts
should strike down laws seeking "to direct the States to imple-
ment or administer a federal regulatory scheme."'1 ' From
these two lines of cases, the Condon court concluded that the
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate individuals
but generally not states."2 In other words, "Congress may only
105. 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), affg 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999); see Mark Hansen, Mid-Atlantic Drift, A.B.A.
J., Aug. 1999, at 66-68 (explaining that although Condon was close (2-1), the
decision was not surprising given the court's conservative reputation).
106. Condon, 155 F.3d at 458.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 459.
109. Id. at 458. This line of cases includes South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505 (1988), Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985), and EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
110. Condon, 155 F.3d at 459 n.4 (relying on Pennsylvania Dep't of Correc-
tions v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998), and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991)).
111. Condon, 155 F.3d at 459. Such cases include New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
112. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 462.
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'subject state governments to generally applicable laws.'"113
Further, Congress could only preempt states' own regulatory
schemes if Congress "has the authority to regulate [similar]
private activity." 14 The Condon court held that DPPA fell un-
der the second line of cases and thus violated the Tenth
Amendment." 5 DPPA could not be a law of general applicabil-
ity because it was aimed specifically at states-after all, only
states license drivers and vehicles. 6  DPPA would only be a
law of general applicability if it was part of some grand privacy
scheme regulating all types of databases. 117 Although the court
recognized that DPPA would be enforced by the U.S. Attorney
General, the court noted that "state officials must... adminis-
ter the DPPA" because states control and maintain the data-
banks containing driver and vehicle records. 118
The Condon court added that Congress lacked power under
the Fourteenth Amendment to pass DPPA. The court initially
noted that "there is no general constitutional right to pri-
vacy."119 The Supreme Court had only recognized a right to pri-
vacy in such intimate areas as reproduction, contraception, and
113. Id. at 456 (emphasis added) (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 160). The
Fourth Circuit noted, however, that this line of cases was filled with inconsis-
tency. See id. at 458-59 (noting that the Supreme Court had reversed itself
three times in considering whether the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to
state employees).
114. Id. at 463 n.6 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 160).
115. Seeid. at463.
116. See id. at 461-62. As noted previously, the Fourth Circuit believed
that the crucial question was who was being regulated, not what was being
regulated. See supra text accompanying note 107. Thus, the court found it
irrelevant that Congress regulated dissemination of personal information by
private actors in other areas. See also Condon, 155 F.3d at 462 (acknowledg-
ing that Congress had passed under the Commerce Clause such statutes as
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994), the Cable
Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994), and the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1618b (1994)).
117. See id. at 462.
A law is not generally applicable simply because it could be generally
applicable. That Congress could subject private parties to the same
type of regulation is irrelevant to the Tenth Amendment. Congress
may invade the sovereignty of the States only when it actually enacts
a law of general applicability. Nothing short of that will pass consti-
tutional muster.
Id.
118. Id. at 460-62.




marriage.12° These areas generally concern the sanctity of the
home and thus carry a corresponding "reasonable expectation
of privacy."12' There is no such expectation, however, in a
driver or vehicle record, because individuals routinely give out
such information in daily transactions. Further, driving is a
highly regulated field, and motor vehicle records generally have
been considered public. 122
Senior Circuit Judge Phillips dissented, arguing that
DPPA could be passed under the Commerce Clause. 123 Judge
Phillips agreed that the initial question was "whether Congress
may, consistent with the Tenth Amendment, impose its will on
States respecting conduct uniquely engaged in by States and
state actors."2 He suggested Congress could have tied DPPA
to federal highway funding requirements 125 or, as an extreme
measure, Congress could have preempted the entire field of mo-
tor vehicle information disclosure. 2 6 Congress instead chose to
regulate the states directly. Judge Phillips noted such a regu-
lation was quite different from New York and Printz, where the
states were forced to regulate private parties according to fed-
eral, not state, standards.12 Thus, according to Judge Phillips,
the federal government had not commandeered the states to
enforce its regulatory scheme. The federal government still
had the responsibility of enforcing DPPA, and thus Congress
would bear the brunt of the political backlash if the statute
failed. 12
Judge Phillips then turned to the question of whether
DPPA needed to be a generally applicable law.129 Although he
120. See id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (castration);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (mar-
riage)).
121. Id. at 464-65.
122. See id. at 465.
123. See id. at 465 n.1 (Phillips, J. dissenting). Believing that DPPA was a
constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause, Judge Phillips did not reach
the question of whether DPPA could be justified as an exercise of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
124. Id. at 466.
125. See id. The majority rejected this hypothetical as too remote. See id.
at 463 n.6 ("We are hard pressed to see a connection between a privacy statute
and highway funds.").
126. See id. But see supra text accompanying note 114.
127. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 466-67.
128. See id. at 466, 468-69.
129. See id. at 467.
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acknowledged that the Garcia line of .cases dealt with regula-
tions affecting states and private actors equally, he disagreed
with the majority's belief that a federal regulation must be gen-
erally applicable to be constitutional. 30 Instead, he argued
that the statutes at issue in Garcia and its progeny regulated
the states directly, rather than commandeering states to regu-
late third parties.'3 ' Unlike New York, states had the choice of
abiding by the federal guidelines for dissemination or leaving
the field entirely.132 Judge Phillips concluded that DPPA would
be just as "intrusive" on states if it had been passed as part of a
larger privacy scheme.133
Like the Condon majority, the Eleventh Circuit in Pryor v.
Reno'34 also struck down DPPA as unconstitutional. Unlike the
Fourth Circuit, the Pryor court questioned whether DPPA had
a substantial link to interstate commerce. The Pryor court
pointed to the numerous exceptions in DPPA for various le-
gitimate uses of driver and vehicle information. 135  Congress
claimed its "authority to regulate the States' dissemination of
personal DMV information lies in its power to regulate the
commercial aspect of this information," but the interstate as-
pect of DMV records had "escaped" through these exceptions. 136
The Pryor court, however, ultimately did not "resolve this
troublesome issue [because the court believed that] the Act
violated the Tenth Amendment." 137 While acknowledging that
130. See id. at 467-68.
131. See id. at 468 (relying loosely on Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth
Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Procedural Protections, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1657 (1987)). Under Odom's theory, "general applicability" is irrelevant
to the consideration of Tenth Amendment challenges to federal laws. See
Odom, supra, at 1679-81. For example, Congress could have passed a mini-
mum wage statute aimed solely at states as employers but could not require
states to enforce a minimum wage against private actors. See Condon, 155
F.3d at 468 & n.3.
132. Cf South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 509 (1987) (upholding
"powerful incentives to issue bonds in registered form" to receive tax-exempt
status; states could still issue bonds in unregistered form, but would lose the
exemption).
133. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 469.
134. 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'g 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala.
1998).
135. See id. at 1284 ("In trying to protect legitimate governmental and
business uses of such information, however, Congress riddled the Act with
more holes than Swiss cheese."); see also supra notes 95-100 and accompany-
ing text (citing exceptions to DPPA).
136. Pryor, 171 F.3d at 1284.
137. Id. at 1284-85.
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DPPA established a different regulatory scheme than Printz
and New York, 3' the Pryor court noted that states could only
release driver and vehicle records according to the federal gov-
ernment's directives.'39 Further, DPPA required state in-
volvement to be effective. Because only states keep such rec-
ords, only state officers can regulate the use of these records.
140
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit also rejected
the federal government's reliance on Garcia because the court
did not believe DPPA was a "generally applicable federal regu-
lation."'4 ' Again noting that only states maintain driver and
vehicle records, the Pryor court likened DPPA to Printz because
in both cases, state officers were required to regulate "informa-
tion that belongs to the State and is available to them only in
their official capacity by examining databases and records that
only state officials have access to."
142
Finally, the Pryor court concluded without much comment
that DPPA could not be justified as an exercise of the Four-
teenth Amendment.'43 Although the court conceded a right to
"confidentiality" in personal information, it did not believe such
a right extended to information contained in a driver or vehicle
record.l4
2. Approach of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits
Two other federal circuits have upheld the constitutionality
of DPPA under the Commerce Clause.' 45 The Tenth Circuit
138. See id. at 1285 ("We recognize that the DPPA does not compel Ala-
bama to enact legislation as in New York; nor does it conscript state officers to
help the federal government search for potential violations of federal law as in
Printz.").
139. See id. at 1285-86.
140. See id. at 1286 (noting that under this scheme, state officers would
essentially be "acting as federal agents making federal policy") (relying on
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928-29 (1997)).
141. Id. at 1286.
142. Id. at 1288 n.8.
143. See id. at 1288 n.10.
144. See id. The Eleventh Circuit offered James v. City of Douglas, 941
F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), as an example of a right to privacy.
See Pryor, 171 F.3d at 1288 n.10.
145. Because both circuits found DPPA to be a constitutional exercise of
the Commerce Clause, neither addressed whether DPPA could be upheld un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. See Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d
1266, 1273 n.6 (10th Cir. 1998); Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir.
1998). Both circuits also explicitly rejected a First Amendment challenge to
DPPA. See id. at 1007; Loving v. United States, No. 97-6060, 1997 U.S. App.
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was the first circuit to uphold DPPA, overturning a district
court decision. 14 6 Like the Fourth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit
turned to New York and Printz to ascertain the "constitutional
line between federal and state power." 47 But the Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's reading of these cases to
"establish[] a blanket rule that 'Congress may only subject
state governments to generally applicable law.'" 148 Agreeing
with the Condon dissent, the court noted that the Fourth Cir-
cuit's initial inquiry 149 was flawed because DPPA would have
the same impact on states even if it was part of a "generally
applicable" law.'50 The release of personal data is not "uniquely
governmental" and is already subject to considerable federal
regulation, unlike vehicle and driver licensing and registra-
tion.15 1
Further, the Tenth Circuit noted, the Supreme Court had
upheld commercial regulations that imposed burdens only on
states.'52 For example, in South Carolina v. Baker, the Court
upheld a statute removing the tax-exempt status for public
bonds issued by states and localities, causing them to make
administrative and legislative changes to qualify for such
changes. 53 The Tenth Circuit noted that if Congress could
force states wishing to issue bonds to conform to federal regula-
tions, then surely Congress could do the same to states wishing
to sell driver and vehicle records. 154
Soon after the Oklahoma decision, the Seventh Circuit
reached a similar decision in Travis v. Reno.)5 5  The Travis
LEXIS 23639 at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 1997) (dismissing a First Amendment
claim for lack of standing).
146. See Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1272-73,
147. Id. at 1269.
148. Id. at 1271 (quoting Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 461 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999)).
149. See supra text accompanying note 107 (stating that the crucial ques-
tion, according to the Fourth Circuit, is who, not what, is being regulated).
150. See Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Condon, 155 F.3d at 469
(Phillips, J., dissenting)).
151. Id. at 1272 (pointing to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1681b (1994), and the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994),
as examples of federal regulations limiting the dissemination of personal in-
formation).
152. See id.
153. See id. (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 509 (1987)); see
also supra notes 58, 132.
154. See id.
155. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1001 (7th Cir. 1998). The decision
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court rejected Wisconsin's argument that DPPA commandeered
states in the same manner as Printz and New York. 5 DPPA's
requirement that Wisconsin establish a regulatory "mecha-
nism" was not "forbidden commandeering."' 57 The Court noted
that the Fair Labor Standards Act, which the Supreme Court
upheld in Garcia, likewise required states to develop regulatory
schemes according to federal guidelines.'58 The Seventh Circuit
determined that courts should only apply the "anti-
commandeering rule" when the federal government seeks to
use the states to regulate its citizens, not when the federal gov-
ernment seeks to regulate the states as marketplace partici-
pants.159
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Travis court also found nothing
unique about states' record-keeping systems. The only
"unique" state function is licensing and registration, which
DPPA does not regulate.' 60 Thus, Congress was regulating
Wisconsin and other states as owners of databases, not as
states. 16' The court rejected Wisconsin's argument that Con-
gress could only regulate state-owned databases if it regulated
all such databases under a "generally applicable" law.' 62 Even
Wisconsin conceded that a state operating a string of video
rental stores would be subject to the Video Privacy Protection
Act. 163
Both circuits criticized the Fourth Circuit for overstepping
its authority. The Tenth Circuit chastised the Fourth Circuit
overturned a trial court's judgment, Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D.
Wis. 1998).
156. See Travis, 163 F.3d at 1003.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 1003-04.
159. See id. at 1004-05.
160. See id. ("Yet the activity under consideration is not licensing but dis-
closure.").
161. See id. at 1005 (noting that "[i]t is hard to name any substantial col-
lection of information yet to be regulated").
162. See id. at 1006 (reasoning that "[a] statute covering all databases
would rival the Internal Revenue Code for complexity without offering states
any real defense from the cost and inconvenience of regulation").
163. See id. at 1004. The Travis court also noted that the Video Privacy
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994), closely mirrored DPPA. See Travis,
163 F.3d at 1004. Indeed, the Video Privacy Protection Act was also inspired
by an invasion of privacy: during the Supreme Court nomination hearings for
Judge Robert Bork, a newspaper published a "profile" of the judge based on
movies his family had rented at a local video store. See S. REP. No. 100-599,
at 5 (1988).
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for following legal trends rather than actual doctrine.1 4 The
Seventh Circuit noted that the Condon holding was "some dis-
tance" from Garcia and New York.' 6 The Seventh Circuit also
pointed out that the Fourth Circuit, not the Supreme Court,
had found that states could only be regulated by generally ap-
plicable laws.166
B. CONGRESS HAS Tm ABILITY To REGULATE STATE PRACTICES
Congress was well within the parameters of its enumer-
ated powers when it enacted DPPA. First, in the absence of
congressional action, the states were selling a type of national
resource-personal information about their citizens-in the na-
tional marketplace. As noted by the Seventh and Tenth Cir-
cuits, Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce is su-
preme. 67  Second, the states conducted these commercial
transactions in an indiscriminate manner, thus possibly in-
fringing on citizens' privacy. Congress could address either
situation through its enumerated powers. The Condon and
Pryor courts instead improperly weighed state sovereignty as
more important than uniform national commercial policies and
individuals' privacy interests.16 8
1. Congress May Regulate States as Participants in Interstate
Commerce
Although Congress's power to regulate commercial activi-
ties is not absolute, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits miscon-
strued restrictions on congressional control of state commercial
activities.' 69 Congress does have the ability to regulate directly
state activities that have an impact on interstate commercial
164. See Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998).
As the court stated,
[w]hile we are cognizant of the Supreme Court's trend established by
New York and Printz... [i]f a precedent of the Supreme Court...
"has direct application in a case... the Court of Appeals should fol-
low the case that directly controls,"... [even if it] "appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions."
Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 484 (1989)).
165. See Travis, 163 F.3d at 1006.
166. See id. (pointing out that the Condon opinion misinterpreted New
York by adding the word "only").
167. See supra notes 152-54, 160-63 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 108-18, 137-40 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 108-18, 137-40 and accompanying text.
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activity.170 This ability is not affected by current Supreme
Court rulings on the Tenth Amendment or the Commerce
Clause. 17
1
a. DPPA Does Not Commandeer States
The Tenth Amendment does not prohibit federal commer-
cial regulations that have an affect on state activities. 7 2 The
Tenth Amendment is not supposed to protect a state's commer-
cial activities.173 Rather, the Tenth Amendment prevents the
federal government from using the states as an enforcement
mechanism in a federal regulatory scheme. 174 Affirmative re-
quirements are quite different than negative prohibitions be-
cause the federal government is not mandating that the states
take a particular action, but limiting their range of activities. 175
Under the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' reading of Printz and
New York, there is no difference between affirmative responsi-
bilities and negative restrictions. Indeed, these courts held
170. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
172. The states challenging DPPA argued that complying with DPPA
would affect state motor vehicle agencies. See Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d
921, 928 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (noting that the Wisconsin Department of Transpor-
tation had to "train employees," create and mail forms on DPPA procedures,
and "answer questions about the act"), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998);
Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1324 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (noting Alabama's
fear that DPPA compliance would impose "substantial costs"), rev'd, 171 F.3d
1281 (11th Cir. 1999). New York and Printz, however, do not suggest that any
impingement on state sovereignty is a violation of the Tenth Amendment. See
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot
force state executives to carry out a federal regulatory scheme); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot force the
states through the Commerce Clause to adopt affirmative regulations).
173. The Tenth Amendment was not designed to protect market participa-
tion because interstate commercial activity is not an intrastate act of govern-
ance. See Manheim, supra note 23, at 572-73 ("The distinction between the
governmental and proprietary activities of states was also important in de-
termining the reach of the tenth amendment. Although a state's sovereign
functions might be protected from federal interference, its proprietary actions
were on a par with private parties." (citation omitted)); id. at 583 ("When par-
ticipating in the market, the state is not 'regulating' commerce any more than
is a private trader; it is 'contracting.'").
174. See New York, 505 U.S. at 164-66 (1992) (holding that the Commerce
Clause "does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation
of interstate commerce").
175. See id. at 166 (noting that "even where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those
acts").
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that DPPA placed affirmative duties, not negative restrictions,
on the states. 7 The courts argued these duties were imper-
missible "commandeering" in the same manner as Printz and
New York. 177
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, however, misconstrued
the appropriate meaning and application of the term "comman-
deering."178 Several states had to alter their administrative
policies or statutes to comply with DPPA.7 9 The courts should
not consider such changes as unconstitutional "commandeer-
ing."8 0 For example, the federal mandates in New York and
Printz upset the federalist notion of political accountability be-
cause federal officials could reap the political rewards of "solv-
ing" a problem, while state officials handled dirty, politically
unsavory work such as raising taxes to pay for enforcing fed-
eral regulations. 181
DPPA required some states to change procedures but did
not require substantive changes in states' policies on driving
and vehicular regulations. While DPPA is a substantive fed-
eral decision, it touches on areas traditionally considered
within federal powers-namely civil rights and commercial
176. According to Condon and Pryor, even though DPPA prohibited state
action, the mere act of complying with DPPA was an affirmative duty. Thus,
the federal government commandeered the states by forcing state legislatures
to adopt legislation to bring state agencies into compliance with the federal
statute and making state officers determine who was qualified to receive
driver and motor vehicle records. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1285-86
(11th Cir. 1999); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 460-61 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
177. See supra notes 106-13, 136-41 and accompanying text.
178. See Pryor, 171 F.3d at 1284-85; Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
179. See generally Yacavone, supra note 9 (describing the various tactics
states have taken to comply with DPPA). The DPPA requirements, however,
"feel" different than those required by the statutes considered in New York
and Printz. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
180. Compare the level of compliance in DPPA (prohibiting sales of public
records) with New York, see supra notes 53-56 (discussing the requirement
that the states adopt a policy on hazardous waste disposal), and Printz, see su-
pra notes 57-61 (discussing the requirement that state executives regulate gun
purchases according to federal guidelines). Negative commercial directives, or
prohibiting harmful goods from being sold in the national marketplace, were
one of the first recognized commerce clause powers. See STONE ET AL., supra
note 24, at 194-205 (discussing the development of the Commerce Clause as a
means of prohibiting the sale and transport of goods across interstate lines).
States, of course, are free to go beyond the requirements of DPPA and
pass even stricter privacy laws. See Yacavone, supra note 9, at 23 (noting that
three states had strict privacy laws prior to the passage of DPPA).
181. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
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policy. 82 Forcing states to adopt substantive changes would
violate the Tenth Amendment.'83 Substantive issues such as
minimum requirements for receiving a driver's license remain
exclusively within the control of state governments. 1
84
b. Federal Regulations Do Not Need To Be "Generally Applica-
ble" To Regulate States
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits held that states can only
be regulated by the federal government as part of a larger
regulatory scheme which applies to both private and public ac-
tors equally. 8 ' If a state enters into a commercial venture us-
ing its own unique resources, it can never be subjected to fed-
eral regulations because its sovereignty would be violated. 8 '
182. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
183. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (noting that "the
powers conferred upon the Federal Governm ent by the Constitution were
phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal
Government's role [into areas that the Framers might have expected to re-
main state responsibilities, such as waste disposal]"). Congress has regulated
vehicle and driving standards, but such statutes have been upheld as merely
persuasive, not coercive, spending provisions. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a requirement that states must adopt the na-
tional drinking age as a prerequisite for receiving federal aid for highway
maintenance). Although driving and automobiles play a substantial role in
interstate commerce, Congress probably could not regulate a state's adminis-
trative and licensing procedures directly. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 564-66 (1995).
Conversely, selling records is not a "traditional" state function; indeed, it
is not even a unique function. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1004-05 (7th
Cir. 1998) (observing that DDPA "affects states as owners of data, rather than
sovereigns," making states no different than "the corner Blockbuster Video
outlet"). Selling records is commercial, not a political function or governance.
See Manheim, supra note 23, at 602-04 (noting that Garcia rejects the idea
that a state has the same immunity when acting either as a proprietor or as a
sovereign). DPPA does not invade the states' traditional province of vehicle
and driver licensing: it does not change the minimum age requirement to drive
a vehicle, does not determine whether a car must have a front and rear license
plate, and does not contemplate a new registration scheme. DPPA merely tar-
gets the use of personal records in the open market. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721
(1994 & Supp. II 1997).
184. See Travis, 163 F.3d at 1008 ("It is quite enough to say that the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act leaves the state's internal and political affairs
alone and regulates only how it interacts with private parties who seek infor-
mation in its possession.").
185. See supra notes 112-13, 141-42 and accompanying text.
186. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545
(1985) (rejecting as "unworkable" any test "identifying 'uniquely' governmental
functions"). Another way to solve this problem would be to overrule Garcia
and return to the "traditional state functions" doctrine: states traditionally li-
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This conclusion is flawed for two reasons. First, following this
line of reasoning, any federal regulation aimed at state com-
mercial activity would violate the Tenth Amendment.18 7 Mere
changes in states' administrative policies to conform to federal
guidelines, however, do not necessarily implicate a threat to
state sovereignty."8 ' Further, DPPA is no different from other
privacy statutes that regulate "owners of databases."8 9 Gener-
ally, once Congress begins to regulate a commercial activity,
anyone engaging in that commercial activity-whether a state,
a corporation, or an individual-must make some changes to
standard operating procedures. 1
90
cense vehicles and drivers, but selling information is not a traditional function
or even a function unique to states. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 459 n.3
(4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999). Thus, Congress could
pass DPPA without threatening state sovereignty because keeping records is
neither a traditional nor unique state function. This would allow Chief Justice
Rehnquist's prediction in Garcia to be fulfilled. See id.
187. For example, if a state could use the market participant exemption to
escape from the dormant Commerce Clause, then
market participant immunity may prompt the state to purchase an
enterprise and regulate it as proprietor, rather than as sovereign. A
state prohibited from excluding non-resident use of local landfills
could overcome commerce clause scrutiny by purchasing the property.
A state unable to prohibit the export of hydroelectric power generated
on its rivers might be able to do so if it owns the utility company. A
city concerned with noise at its local airport would have greater con-
trol as owner-operator than as regulator and might be well-advised to
buy it from its private owner.
Manheim, supra note 23, at 602-03 (footnotes omitted). Suppose then that
Congress did pass legislation prohibiting local landfills from excluding out-of-
state waste, thus making this an "active" Commerce Clause question. Condon
and Pyor would allow a state-owned landfill to exclude out-of-state waste be-
cause Congress would otherwise be impinging on state sovereignty. See supra
notes 112-18, 14142 and accompanying text.
188. New York and Printz do not suggest that any impingement on state
sovereignty is a violation of the Tenth Amendment. Further, the Tenth
Amendment was not necessarily designed to protect states' participation in
the marketplace. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (arguing that
states lose their shield of sovereignty when acting as market participants).
189. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, states'
driver and motor vehicle databases are not necessarily unique state resources.
The "uniqueness" of such databases comes only from the fact that the records
are created via a unique state function. But once the state has performed this
function, the data is no longer unique.
190. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988) (noting that
any federal policy will require some change in state regulatory policy). Here,
the state is no different from a utility company or a magazine that chooses to
sell its list of clients or subscribers. Once the state acts like other commercial
participants, it should lose its sovereignty "shield" and become like any other
commercial actor. For example, why should public employers escape mini-
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Second, Congress's commercial regulatory power may pre-
empt states' decision-making powers in order to establish uni-
form commercial policies. 9 ' The states should not be able to
avoid federal regulations merely because these regulations con-
flict with their own commercial policies. 192 Allowing states to
side-step federal regulations would ignore the nation's disas-
trous economic experience under the Articles of Confederation,
which led the Framers to place the power to regulate interstate
commerce in the federal government to ensure uniformity. 93 If
states could freely enter the marketplace without being con-
strained by federal regulations, then they could destroy na-
tional unity by engaging in trade wars and favoring local indus-
try.'94 Thus, the courts have generally prohibited states from
mum wage requirements or be able to discriminate against the elderly? See,
e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-56 (holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act
should be applied to all employers, including state agencies).
Moreover, DPPA is as close to a law of general applicability as possible.
Both states and private actors who can lawfully receive driver and vehicle rec-
ords are forbidden from releasing them to third parties not falling under one of
DPPA's exceptions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994 & Supp. II 1997). DPPA
merely targets the source of such information (the states) and the permissible
recipients.
191. See U.S. CONST_ art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Founding Fathers recognized the
need for unity and uniformity among the states. See THE FEDERALIST No. 3
(John Jay). The Articles of Confederation allowed each state to play a role in
the nation's economy by setting tariffs, creating state currencies, and other
commercial activities. See UNGER, supra note 35, at 146-47. This arrange-
ment was disastrous to the creation of national unity. States could engage in
economic warfare, using their economic policies to favor their own citizens
while retaliating against other states. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 21, 22 (Alex-
ander Hamilton); see also FEREJOHN & WEINGAST, supra note 32, at 5; Hin-
shaw, supra note 23, at 520. The Founding Fathers sought to achieve unity by
allowing only the federal government to control the national economy. The
Travis court's ruling, however, is a step backwards. Under that court's view, a
state would be able to determine what products, goods, and services can be
placed into the national economy under the guise of "state sovereignty" as long
as it had a hand in the product's development. See supra note 187 and accom-
panying text (discussing the problems with extending Tenth Amendment im-
munity when states act as market participants); see also Lauricella, supra
note 52, at 1397.
192. Travis, 163 F.3d at 1007-08 ("Surely plaintiffs don't mean that all fed-
eral laws violate the Constitution when applied to states, because they may
contradict the choices made by the states' elected legislators.").
193. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) ("If a power
is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States ... ."); see also Oklahoma
v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1270-73 (10th Cir. 1998); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 44 (James Madison); supra note 191.
194. See THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (John Jay) (comparing the wars between
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adopting regulations that threaten interstate commerce 195 and
only permitted them to pursue purely commercial activities in
the absence of congressional direction. 9 6 DPPA, however, is a
clear indication of the congressional voice, which declares that
states can no longer sell personal records in the national mar-
ketplace.19
7
c. The Courts Should Be Respectful of Political Institutions
As unelected officials, judges should recognize a degree of
institutional respect for the political branches. In New York
and Printz, the Court feared that states would be blamed for
their inability to solve problems of national consequence and
unfairly face the political backlash.'98 Here, the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits' concerns about political accountability are
misplaced.' 99 First, only states issue drivers' licenses and reg-
European nations to potential trade wars between the states); see also Travis,
163 F.3d at 1007-08; THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton); supra
notes 23, 187.
195. See Hinshaw, supra note 23, at 518-26 (discussing justifications for
the Dormant Commerce Clause).
196. See Bair, supra note 23, at 2420-27 (discussing the market participant
doctrine); Hinshaw, supra note 23, at 523-26 (same).
197. See Yacavone, supra note 9, at 23 (discussing the prohibitions on state
motor vehicle agencies).
198. See supra notes 52-61.
199. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-54
(recognizing "[t]he effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving
the States' interests"). Political accountability is not a strong argument, par-
ticularly in this situation. See Jackson, supra note 40, at 2200-05 (arguing
that political accountability is a poor rationale for striking down federal stat-
utes); see also MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 74, at 84-85 (noting that the
state is a proper defendant when it fails in its duty to maintain the confidenti-
ality of private facts). After all, each state has equal representation in the
Senate regardless of population. Cf Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional
Senate, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 213 (1995) (arguing-albeit jokingly-that
the makeup of the Senate runs counter to democratic principles). Indeed,
states can lobby for their special interests much more effectively than privacy
advocates, who represent a large, diffuse group. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY,
supra note 50, at 49-57 (discussing the "free rider" problems associated with
mobilizing the electorate around widely-distributed benefits). Privacy is an
abstract concept, making it very difficult for advocates to mobilize the elector-
ate to support reforms. See VISIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 81, at 5, 13-14. If
a majority of the people's representatives (the House) and a majority of the
states' representatives (the Senate) agree on a policy within the scope of Con-
gress's powers, then the courts should respect this popular decision. To do
otherwise would mean the United States is not a union at all.
Some commentators pointed to the 1994 "Republican Revolution" as evi-
dence that the system Garcia envisioned does work. The Republican landslide
was a response to excessive federal regulations and abuses of the Tenth
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ister motor vehicles.2" Second, Congress passed DPPA because
the states were indiscriminately releasing personal informa-
tion.a0' Consequently, states should be blamed for the result-
ing harms that occur when state agencies indiscriminately re-
lease personal information.
Whether DPPA will be an effective regulatory scheme is
not a question for the courts.2 2 The Eleventh Circuit's sugges-
tion that DPPA might not truly regulate commerce because it is
filled with "more holes than Swiss cheese"20 3 was inappropri-
ate.2°1 Congress granted these exceptions as a way of letting
states continue to sell records for legitimate purposes.205 This
compromise is less burdensome on states than forcing them to
prohibit driver and vehicle record sales altogether. 2°6  States
that do sell records will only need to adopt minor changes to
continue this venture.
Amendment, and returned power to the states. See FEREJOHN & WEINGAST,
supra note 32, at 27, 157-58 (suggesting that the Republican Revolution was
an example of the Garcia system); Jackson, supra note 40, at 2238-39 (same);
see also Lauricella, supra note 52, at 1377-78 (noting, for example, that Re-
publican Presidential candidate Bob Dole carried a copy of the Tenth Amend-
ment with him on the campaign trail).
200. See NOOK, supra note 15, at 56-57.
201. Indeed, it was California's indiscriminate release of Rebecca
Schaeffer's record that led to the passage of DPPA. See supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
202. Cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) ("The law... is con-
stantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially
moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts
will be very busy indeed."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("I do not to any extent whatever base my view... on a
belief that the law is wise or that its policy is a good one.").
203. Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999).
204. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758 (1982) ("It is not for us to
say whether the means chosen by Congress represent the wisest choice."). The
court's role is to judge the legality of DPPA, not its effectiveness. A regulation
can allow items to flow into commerce as well as keeping items out of the
stream of commerce. If Congress has the power to completely prohibit the sale
of driver and vehicle records, see Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 469 (4th Cir.
1998) (Phillips, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999), then it
surely has the lesser power to prohibit indiscriminate sales having potentially
unethical and illegal purposes.
205. The structure of DPPA suggests that the political process works. The
opt-out provision allows states to continue to sell records, and gives individu-
als a means of protecting their privacy. See supra note 100.
206. Cf FERC, 456 U.S. at 765 ("Congress adopted a less intrusive scheme
and allowed the States to continue regulating in the area on the condition that
they consider the suggested federal standards.").
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The courts' only role is to determine whether Congress is
exercising its powers lawfully; if so, Congress's power is su-
preme." 7 DPPA regulates a wholly commercial activity, the
sales of state records in the stream of commerce. 208 In contrast,
the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez attempted to
regulate mere possession.2 9  The Lopez Court concluded that
possessing a weapon in a designated school zone was too re-
mote from an actual commercial transaction to be subject to
Commerce Clause regulation.210  DPPA, however, is directed
toward an actual commercial transaction.21' Thus, the courts
should find that Congress properly enacted DPPA under the
Commerce Clause without usurping areas traditionally within
the powers of the states.
207. See Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358, 1361 (W.D. Okla.,
1997) (noting that judges must afford "great weight to the decisions of Con-
gress") (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102
(1973)), rev'd, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Bair, supra note 23, at
2423 (noting that "the political nature of state proprietary activity makes con-
gressional action more appropriate than judicial intervention"); Bauerle, supra
note 28, at 54-55 (discussing what happens once Congress "speaks" to dormant
commerce conduct).
208. Note that one must believe that DPPA falls within the Lopez restate-
ment of the Commerce Clause before finding DPPA to be a lawful execution of
the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-66
(1995) (arguing that there are limits to the reach of the Commerce Clause).
Information has an interstate connection and is not entirely an intrastate ac-
tivity like education or domestic relations. Numerical identifiers do have
value because they can easily be used by unscrupulous individuals to obtain
home addresses, social security numbers, and other data for criminal pur-
poses. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 29, at 104-09 (discussing infor-
mation as a type of commodity).
209. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
210. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); St. Laurent, su-
pra note 29, at 78, 81-82 (analyzing the concurring opinions in the Lopez deci-
sion).
211. See Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (noting
that Wisconsin makes some $8 million annually from such sales), rev'd, 163
F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998); Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D.S.C. 1997)
(noting that South Carolina collects fees for sales of motor vehicle records),
affd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999); see
also Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 29, at 104-09 (discussing information
as a tangible commodity); Yacavone, supra note 9, at 23 (noting the profitabil-
ity of driver and vehicle record sales). Congress also made substantial find-
ings to demonstrate the link between commerce and the sale of records. See
supra note 93 (discussing congressional testimony); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at
562-63 (noting that, while not dispositive, congressional findings may help ajudge locate the link between commerce and the regulated conduct); Frickey,
supra note 34, at 711-12 (suggesting that findings should be given substantial
weight when they are not "boilerplate").
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2. Congress May Enforce a Right to Privacy Against the
States Under the Fourteenth Amendment
a. States Have a Duty To Respect Individual Privacy by Enact-
ing Appropriate Safeguards for the Release of Personal Infor-
mation
Only the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits addressed the fed-
eral government's second argument that DPPA is a permissible
exercise of congressional power under the Enforcement Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both circuits held that the ju-
dicial definition of privacy did not encompass the information
contained in driver- and vehicle records.212  Such a holding
would have vast repercussions for federal and state regulatory
and police powers.213 The driver's license is considered a reli-
able form of identification because it contains so much informa-
tion.214 Allowing an individual to invoke a right of privacy
whenever a creditor or law enforcement officer needed to obtain
his or her name or address would impede efficient government
and commerce. 215
There remains a credible argument that even at such a
mundane level, personal privacy should be respected and Con-
gress may enforce a right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 16  Although requiring motorists to license and
register their vehicles and keeping such information on file is
generally within the states' authority,217 states that indiscrimi-
nately release such information intrude on individual privacy
and autonomy. Citizens reasonably believe that states use in-
formation such as social security numbers, home addresses,
212. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1288 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999); Condon,
155 F.3d at 464-65.
213. For these reasons, it makes more sense to recognize personal informa-
tion as a commercial right rather than a civil right enforceable under the
Fourteenth Amendment. It would be extremely hazardous to elevate the in-
formation found in a driver or motor vehicle record to the same protected
status as abortion, marriage, and other familial and reproduction rights.
214. See NOCK, supra note 15, at 59.
215. See James Rule & Lawrence Hunter, Property Rights in Personal
Data, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 81, at 177-180; ETZIONI, supra note
15, at 3-7.
216. Before Congress can exercise its remedial powers under the Enforce-
ment Clause, the judiciary must determine that there is a constitutional right
which is being suppressed by the states' discriminatory practice. As recog-
nized in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977), and evidenced by common
law, nondisclosure is part of the right to privacy.
217. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461.
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and birth dates only for administrative purposes 18 and do not
expect that such data will be sold to anyone willing to hand
over a few dollars.219 Indeed, the vast majority of citizens be-
lieve record-keeping agencies should give individuals the op-
portunity to opt out of any distribution scheme.220 The states'
failure to keep such personal information private violates "a
concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures."221 DPPA merely fulfills this duty by attempting to
ensure the security of such personal records.222
b. The Courts Should Respect Congress's Deliberative Powers
To Enact an Appropriate Remedy
Congress is the best branch to determine how to enforce a
right to nondisclosure of personal information. Unlike the
courts, Congress has broad fact-finding powers, allowing it to
consider when and how personal data can be released. As a na-
tional representative body, Congress also is a better indicator of
what the reasonable person believes should be private and can
218. Court rulings that suggest one "assumes the risk" that his or her per-
sonal information will be routinely given out by a service provider are anach-
ronistic. See CATE, supra note 68, at 59 (noting that the Supreme Court is of-
ten a poor barometer of what society feels is "reasonable"). Society does not
merely rely on automobiles and telephones-they have become a necessity.
See Smith, supra note 83, at 200-05 (discussing the expectation customers
have with their telephone service providers). Even if motor vehicle records
have a low privacy value, what is a state's counterbalancing interest? The
state cannot claim it needs access because it already has the records. Fur-
thermore, the party claiming a need for access is often a private third party
who may not be able to assert a legitimate need to justify violating another
person's privacy. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d.
570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (considering the degree of need for access as a factor).
219. The act of reducing human beings to a numerical identifiers is ethi-
cally questionable. See Komuves, supra note 21, at 571 ("Prevalent ideals of
liberalism and democracy promote treating people as individuals, not as num-
bers. We associate the treatment of people as numbers with totalitarian re-
gimes and institutions...." (footnotes omitted)); see also HIXSON, supra note
68, at 214 (comparing President Nixon, who used federal databanks to track
his enemies, to despotic kings, who "used official surveillance information to
punish disaffected citizens").
220. See Mary J. Culnan & Robert J. Bies, Fair Information Practices for
Marketing, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 81, at 151-53.
221. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
222. See MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 74, at 84-85 (citing Florida Star
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), where the Court blamed the state, not the me-
dia, for improper disclosure of a rape victim's identity); see also Mintz, supra
note 74, at 454-57 (arguing that nondisclosure claims should hinge on whether
the person who discloses private information lawfully received it).
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provide a uniform solution.223 Courts, on the other hand, have
limited contact with the public and can only make decisions on
a case-by-case basis, often creating a diversity of opinions about
what a reasonable person expects should be private. For ex-
ample, the district court in Travis held that there is no expecta-
tion of privacy when obtaining a driver's license, because a per-
son gives the same information to a grocery clerk when cashing
a check.224  However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit pointed
out that the same type of personal information is also given to a
video rental clerk when applying for a store membership, which
is protected information.225
Even if the disclosure of such information does not rise to
the level of confidentiality required for judicial protection,226
Congress may seek to establish a statutory minimum of protec-
tion using its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.227 A
difference of opinion between the courts and Congress regard-
ing the appropriate means to enforce a judicially-recognized
civil right does not necessarily create a constitutional viola-
tion.228 Congress is well within the parameters of the Four-
teenth Amendment when it passes legislation designed to pro-
hibit states from impeding on judicially recognized rights.22 9
223. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
224. See Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd,
163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
225. See Travis, 163 F.3d at 1005.
226. As several courts have noted, numerous other courts have found that
the release of potentially more embarrassing information does not constitute a
violation of privacy. See, e.g., Travis, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (relying on Man-
gels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986)). But see Jackson, supra note 40,
at 2216 (arguing that "[individual rights, unlike the interests of states, do not
have the same 'political safeguards' and thus require more judicial protec-
tion"). The court answered the wrong question, however. The issue is not
whether the court should find a violation of privacy if a state accidentally dis-
closes an individual's personal information to a stalker, an identity thief, or
the like; the issue is whether Congress can require the states to fulfill their
duty to safeguard their constituents' information.
227. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting several ex-
amples in which Congress legislated greater protection for individual rights
than those found in the Constitution), cert. denied sub nom. Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998). After all, once the
Court has determined that a right exists, it is well within Congress's power to
remedy any state abuses of such a right. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 519 (1997).
228. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
229. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). Congress is
merely implementing the "statutory duty" suggested by Whalen. See Whalen
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Here, Congress is providing individuals with a means of exer-
cising their right to privacy by prohibiting states from indis-
criminately releasing personal information.230
Further, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits underestimated
the importance of DPPA as a means of protecting individuals'
privacy. The courts too easily dismissed DPPA's protection
simply because it is similar to information that individuals of-
ten give out freely.23' Such a comparison misses an obvious
point. Consumers have a choice about what information they
want revealed to the public when they order telephone service,
and can request complete anonymity.232 Similarly, a store clerk
might ask a customer for his or her driver's license number or
social security number when writing a check,233 but a customer
could choose an alternative method of payment so that he or
she does not have to disclose such information.234 A "customer"
at a state motor vehicle agency must provide personal informa-
tion when he or she "does business" with the state by obtaining
a driver's license or registering his or her vehicle. DPPA allows
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
230. Cf Budnitz, supra note 83, at 860-65, 881-82 (discussing opt-out sys-
tems as a means of giving consumers control over their personal information).
231. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 465 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,
119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999); Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998). A phone
book contains an individual's name, address, and of course phone number. See
Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (noting that the in-
formation contained in a driver or vehicle record is "available to anyone with a
phone book"), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000. A driver's record may contain much more
information, however, including an individual's social security number, date of
birth, previous addresses, and any history of fines or violations. See NOCK,
supra note 15, at 59 (listing some of the information that may appear in a rec-
ord).
232. See Smith, supra note 83, at 200-05 (discussing ways in which indi-
viduals attempt to show a reasonable expectation of privacy by purchasing an
unlisted phone number). Not only can a consumer request an unlisted number
but he or she can also request that the phone number remain anonymous and
be "blanked out" on caller identification.
Further, the information contained in driver and vehicle records is not the
same as information found in a phone book listing. Driver and vehicle records
frequently contain social security numbers, previous registered addresses, and
dates of birth-all of which can be used to commit credit fraud and identity
theft. See Budnitz, supra note 83, at 863-65 (discussing potential abuses of
numerical identifiers).
233. See Travis, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 925.
234. See Smith, supra note 83, at 213-20 (discussing alternatives that pro-
tect privacy in "monopoly" situations, such as telephone utilities).
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individuals to request an "unlisted" license or registration with
their state's department of motor vehicles.
235
CONCLUSION
An old children's joke asks when is a door not a door.236
Likewise, the courts must recognize that there are occasions
when a state is not sovereign. Once states begin to make arbi-
trary commercial decisions, they cease to be sovereigns and be-
come mere market participants. States also have special duties
to protect their constituents' rights, which should not be ne-
glected for the sake of making a quick buck. The federal gov-
ernment can regulate such conduct under either the Commerce
Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. While federalism is an
important concept, it should not bar creating uniform commer-
cial regulations and securing individual rights.
As the Supreme Court reviews DPPA's constitutionality,
the Court should consider that the rights of states should not
necessarily remain supreme over the rights of the people or the
powers of the federal government. In light of recent decisions
that continue to evaluate states' rights, however, it seems un-
likely that DPPA will survive constitutional scrutiny.
235. See id. at 200-02 (arguing that there should be ways for an individual
to express a reasonable privacy expectation). For example, an individual
willing to spend additional money on an unlisted phone number demonstrates
a greater expectation of privacy than individuals willing to have their num-
bers appear in a phone book.
236. A door is not a door when it's "ajar," or ajar.
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